Ed25519 Signature Malleability

Overview

The Ed25519 signature malleability detector identifies Solana programs that verify Ed25519 signatures without enforcing canonical form. Non-canonical signatures allow attackers to produce alternative valid signatures for the same message, bypassing deduplication or single-use signature assumptions. For remediation steps, see the Ed25519 Signature Malleability Remediation.

Why This Is an Issue

Ed25519 signatures have a malleability property: for any valid signature (R, S), the pair (R, L - S) where L is the curve order is also valid for the same message. This means each message can have at least two valid signatures. Programs that rely on signature uniqueness — such as tracking which signatures have been used, deduplicating transactions, or enforcing one-time authorization — can be bypassed.

In practice, an attacker can:

• Replay transactions by submitting the malleable variant of an already-used signature.
• Bypass deduplication in airdrop, claim, or voting systems that track used signatures.
• Forge alternative proofs that pass verification but differ from the original.

The canonical form requires S < L (where L is the Ed25519 curve order). Without this check, both S and L - S are accepted as valid.

How to Resolve

// Before: Vulnerable -- non-strict verification
let result = ed25519_verify(&pubkey, &message, &signature);
if !result {
    return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument);
}
// Signature passes but may be non-canonical

// After: Fixed -- use strict verification
let result = ed25519_verify_strict(&pubkey, &message, &signature);
if !result {
    return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument);
}
// Only canonical signatures accepted

Examples

Vulnerable Code

pub fn verify_and_store(
    accounts: &[AccountInfo],
    signature: &[u8; 64],
    message: &[u8],
) -> ProgramResult {
    let pubkey = accounts[0].key.to_bytes();

    // Non-strict verification accepts both canonical and non-canonical
    if !ed25519_verify(&pubkey, message, signature) {
        return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument);
    }

    // Store signature as "used" -- attacker can bypass with malleable variant
    let used_sigs = &mut accounts[1];
    store_used_signature(used_sigs, signature)?;
    Ok(())
}

Fixed Code

pub fn verify_and_store(
    accounts: &[AccountInfo],
    signature: &[u8; 64],
    message: &[u8],
) -> ProgramResult {
    let pubkey = accounts[0].key.to_bytes();

    // Enforce canonical signature form: S < L
    if signature[63] & 0xE0 != 0 {
        return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument);
    }

    if !ed25519_verify(&pubkey, message, signature) {
        return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument);
    }

    let used_sigs = &mut accounts[1];
    store_used_signature(used_sigs, signature)?;
    Ok(())
}

Example JSON Finding

{
  "detector": "ed25519-signature-malleability",
  "severity": "high",
  "confidence": 0.80,
  "title": "Ed25519 Signature Verification Without Canonical Check",
  "description": "Ed25519 signature verification is performed without checking for canonical signature form.",
  "cwe_ids": [347]
}

Detection Methodology

1. Syscall identification: Identifies Ed25519 verification syscalls by name pattern matching (e.g., ed25519_verify, sol_ed25519_check).
2. Strict variant detection: Checks whether the program uses verify_strict or canonical verification variants.
3. Canonical check search: Scans for manual canonical validation patterns such as bit mask checks (signature[63] & 0xE0 == 0) or comparisons against the curve order.
4. Signature storage tracking: Detects when signatures are stored to account data without normalization, indicating deduplication vulnerability.

Limitations

False positives: Programs that implement canonical checks in external library calls or precompiled instructions may be flagged. False negatives: Custom signature verification that does not use recognized syscall names will not be detected. Programs using the Ed25519 precompile instruction via instruction introspection follow a different pattern that may not be fully covered.

Related Detectors

• Signature Replay — detects missing replay protection for signatures
• Weak Randomness — detects insecure cryptographic patterns

References

• Ed25519 Specification — RFC 8032
• Solana Ed25519 Program
• CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
• github.com/solana-labs/solana — Ed25519 SigVerify